Denver Law Review
Volume 8

Issue 10

Article 9

1931

Vol. 8, no. 10: Full Issue
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
8 Dicta (1931).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

DICTA

VOLUME 8
1930-1931

DICTA
$1.75 a year

20 cents a copy

AUGUST, 1931
New Officers and Committees of the Denver Bar
..............
Association ......
..........
The Bench and Bar Outing ....
"By Leave of Court First Had, * * *".
International Laws of War .....
Dictaphun ........

3
......

6
9

..........

15

.

25

................

Colorado Supreme Court Decisions .

.......

.

27

Published monthly by the Denver Bar Association and devoted to the
interests of the Association.
Address all communications concerning:
Editorial Matters, to Dicta, Capitol Life Bldg., Denver, Colo.
Advertising, to Dicta, 717 First National Bank Bldg., Denver, Colo.
Subscriptions, to Dicta, 415 Symes Bldg., Denver, Colo.

DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
1930-1931

ERNEST L. RHOADS, President
ROBERT G. STRONG, First Vice President
GUSTAVE J. ORNAUR, Second Vice President

Symes Building, Phone TAbor 6072

ALBERT J. Gout, JR., Secretary-Treasurer--415

EXECUTIVE SECTION
TRUSTEES:

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

ERNEST L. RHOADS, ex-officio
HAMLET J. BARRY, CHARLES J. MUNE
to July 1, 1931
ROBERT E. MORE, IRA C. ROTHGERBER

ERNEST L. RHOADS, ex-officio
ROBERT G.

STRONG, ex-officio

GUSTAVE J. ORNAUER, ex-officio
FRAZER ARNOLD

to July 1, 1932

WILLIAM E. HUTrroN

HENRY A. DUBBS, B. M. WEBSTER
to July 1, 1933

ROBERT L. STEARNS
ROBERT W. STEELE, JR.

COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION
Luncheons

Memorials

Banquets

Outing

JOHN E. GORSUCH

LANGDON H. LARWILL

RICHARD S. FILLIUS

BENJAMIN E. Swur

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SECTION
Women and Children

Legislative

CriminalJustice

EDGAR MCCOMB

PHILIP S. VAN CISE

Judiciary
DUDLEY W.

American Law Institute
STEPHEN R. CunTn

MARY F. LATHROP

New Court House
HARRIE M. HUMPHREYS

STRICKLAND

BAR STANDARDS AND LEGAL AID SECTION
Ethics
EDWARD D.

UPHAM

Legal Education

Legal Aid

DONALD C. MCCREERY

W. FELDER COOK

Grievance
KENNETH W. ROBINSON

PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION

Citizenship

Press and Bar

ALBERT G. CRAIG

THEODORE EPSTEIN

Judicial Salaries

Publicity

J.

WENDELL STEPHENS

HAMLET

BARRY

Unlawful Practice of Law
MAX MELVILLE

GENERAL
By-Law Revision

Membership

Library

GEORGE STEINMETZ

PAUL P. PROSSER

HENRY

A.

DUBUS

Auditing
ALBERT L. VOGL

Librarian
ESTALENE SECREST

DICTA
EDITORIAL BOARD
JOHN F. PIERCE, Editor-in-Chief
W. CLAYTON CARPENTER
JACKSON M. SEAWELL, Business Mgr.

BENJAMIN E. SWEET, Assistant Editor
BENJAMIN C. HILLIARD, JR.
DAYTON DENIOUS

Supreme Court Decisions
C. CLYDE BARKER, Editor
NATHAN

R.

HAROLD
KODEY

B.

WAGNER

GEORGE L LONGFELLOW, J-

MAX P. ZALL

DICTA
Vol. VIII

AUGUST, 1931

No. 10

THE COMING YEAR
HERE is printed in this issue of Dicta a list of the
various Committees of the Association. We believe
these Committees will be active and efficient. I hope
the membership will give to them their co-operation and
support.
Mr. Albert J. Gould, our worthy Secretary, has consented to act as Chairman of the Luncheons Committee this
year, and he and I are in agreement that our meetings should
be devoted primarily to a consideration of the practical legal
questions of special interest to the profession.
We have provided a new Committee on Current Legal
Events, with Robert E. More as Chairman. It is our thought
that this Committee will bring to the attention of the Association at the meetings, the current legal events of general
interest.
The officers and Committees promise their best efforts
toward the maintenance of the Association on the high plane
which has been established by previous administrations.
(Signed) ELMER L. BROCK,
President.
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THE BENCH AND BAR OUTING
Reported by Leo J. Crowley of the Denver Bar
HAT you who run may read it might be of interest to
know that the party referred to in the above caption
was held on the 25th day of June A. D. 1931 at the
Mount Vernon Country Club. The weather bureau favored
us with an exceptional afternoon and old Sol put in a full
day. The Committee on Arrangements operated with clocklike precision and harmony prevailed throughout.
The Golf Tournament was won for the second successive
year by Churchill Owen and for his efforts Church received
a little black bag. Bill Koolbeck ran second, his reward
being a pair of golf shoes. Then came Chuck Queary whose
net score got him a sweater, also black. A. L. Doud's blind
bogey brought in a sweater and the booby prize went to Floyd
Walpole. Floyd must have given the Committee an honest
count. Just a word in passing about the Golf Course itself.
My suggestion is that next year a prize be given to anyone
who has the endurance and stamina to finish the nine holes.
The fairways (you referred to them as fairways if you were
particularly optimistic) were as smooth as moth eaten velvet
and the rough, make no mistake, was rough. Off the 6th tee
Bob More sliced his shot a trifle to the right. Bob started
to look for his ball and it required a searching party to find
Bob. Paul Hoeffler need not travel to Africa for thrills. He
can get plenty in the rough on this Golf Course. Dick Fillius
hooked to the left on No. 3 and during his search found two
Ford tractors and a pack train.
On the tennis courts, Jack Phelps showed that he has
lost none of his cunning as a racket wielder. He was ably
assisted by Otto Friedrichs and these two were ranked as first
place winners. The little black bags were also issued to Jack
and Otto. Wagner and Anderson were second best and were
presented with a season ticket to Washington Park.
Elson B. Whitney came through with flying colors in the
Bridge Tournament and was presented with a copy of Mr.
Work's suggestions as to how to play the hand if West is
holding six hearts from the Queen and South has a pain in the
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neck. Dick Fillius, the runner up in this event was remembered by the Committee with an autographed edition of Mr.
Culbertson on Bridge.
Al Gould proved himself the best in slapping ringers on
the iron pegs. Al received a pair of horseshoes. Wonder
what he will do with them. This is the automotive age and
I understand the Specialist has retired from the construction
game. The press reports are somewhat garbled and I am
not informed as to the identity of the also rans in this event.
This takes us down to the main event of the day,-the
Baseball game between the Bench and the Bar. A close
thrilling battle was staged, the final score, Bench 23, Bar 3.
The Hon. Charles Sackman was on the mound for the victors
with Judge Crowley doing the receiving. When the Judge
whipped that ball in, the cover wasn't the only thing on the
ball: Following is the inning by inning play: 1st inning;
"Good pitching, Judge Sackman", 3d inning; "Put some stuff
on it Charlie", 5th inning; "Lay it in there Chuck", 9th
inning: "Come on Kid, bust that old Apple". The climax
and turning point of the game came in the seventh inning.
With the score tied at three all the Bar team loaded the bases
with two men out. Up to the plate strode that mighty Sultan
of Swat, G. Walter Bowman. The Judiciary went into a
huddle and after a lengthy argument announced that in their
opinion Billy Adams would not be a candidate for re-election.
The game is resumed with Bowman's mighty bludgeon
menacing the high hopes of the law-makers. Charlie, getting
stronger as the game progressed worked G. Walter for a
count of three balls and two strikes. The crucial moment
was at hand, with everything dependent on the next pitch.
Right down the alley, Bowman made a Motion to Strike
which the Judge promptly overruled and the ball game was
over. Jack Adams officiated as Umpire. Jack's eyes are not
so good for a young fellow. Some of the highlights of the
game: Judge Sackman chucked them in there like a veteran;
Judge More's sparkling performance on the initial sack;
Judge Orahood's hook slide into second; Judge White's long
running one handed catch of Temple's line drive; Judge
Holland struck out three times and the next day handed down
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a decision validating the Tunnel Bonds, No hits, No runs,
One Error.
This concluded the Field Events and the picnickers made
a grand rush for the dining room. The Committee had prepared a feast fit for Kings, (the eating habits of Kings having
changed materially during the past few years). Frank Fetzer
took charge and his broadcast was a huge success. Frank
holds a distinct advantage over the usual announcer. He
doesn't need a Radio Station. Just open any convenient window when Frank is on the air. Fried chicken there was
aplenty and the molars clicked merrily for a couple of hours.
The hall was then cleared for the Presentation exercises
and the entertainment features. Dick Fillius presided as
Master of Ceremonies and presented the awards. In addition
to the above referred to prizes, Judge Stanley Johnson was
awarded a banner for so ably handling the Bar Baseball team
and Jimmy Woods received for his mismanagement of the
Bench team a nice new Cap.
Harry Finesliver's trained troupe performed brilliantly
and entertainingly for the next two hours and with Mr.
Fetzer's assistance, rendered a very edifying conclusion to a
successful day.

"BY LEAVE OF COURT FIRST HAD, * * *"
By Horace N. Hawkins, Jr., of the Denver Bar*
HIS raises the query as to what the duty of the court is
when the district attorney obtains leave to file on information by presenting the same with a false affidavit, and
such fact is made known to the court. Logic and precedent
alike lead to the conclusion that whenever it is made known
to the court that its order giving permission to file an information was entered because of misrepresentations made when
the same was tendered, whether such misrepresentations consist of attaching to the information a false affidavit or of some
other act or statement whereby the court is misled and its
confidence abused, it is the duty of the court to vacate the order granting leave to file the information and to strike the information from the files. There are no Colorado cases dealing directly with this question. In numerous cases before the
Supreme Court convicted defendants have alleged that they
were prejudiced in the trial court by reason of the falsity of
the affidavit accompanying the information, but in none of
them was an attack made upon the order granting leave to
file the information. In the consideration of these decisions
it must be borne in mind that the affidavit is no part of the
information, although the allegations of the information may
be incorporated into the affidavit by appropriate reference.
In some of the Colorado decisions there is language indicating that the truth of the affidavit attached to the information
cannot be questioned by the defendant, but in each such instance such expression is "obiter dictum". A careful analysis
of the decisions of our Supreme Court indicates that in none
of the cases was the trial court specifically requested to vacate
the order granting leave to file the information because of the
imposition upon the court through the presentation on a false
affidavit accompanying the information. The following is a
brief resume of the Colorado decisions.
The fact that affiant was not an eye-witness of the crime
does not show that he could not truthfully swear to the facts
*This article is continued from the June number of Dicta.
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stated in the affidavit of his own knowledge. Holt v. Peo., 23
Colo. 1.
Where a motion to quash for insufficiency of the accompanying affidavit is directed to amended information, and the
original information is not shown by the record, it will be
presumed that at the time of the filing of the amended information the accused was in custody under lawful process issued
by virtue of the first information, and the trial court's ruling
in denying the motion to quash will not be disturbed by the
Supreme Court. Noble v. Peo., 23 Colo. 9.
The information need not allege the obtaining of leave
to file the same. Liggett v. Peo., 26 Colo., 364.
Allegations of affidavit accompanying information cannot be attacked by introduction of extraneous evidence on
motion to quash the information. Berghdahl v. Peo., 27 Colo.
302.
Where defendant goes to trial without questioning the
information or affidavit, he is not entitled to an acquittal when
it develops during the trial that the affidavit is in fact false.
Barr v. Peo., 30 Colo. 522.
The question of the falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered on demurrer to the information. Vickers v. Peo., 31
Colo. 491.
Motion to quash information, made during the trial when
it developed that the party verifying the same had no personal
knowledge of the commission of the offense charged, was
properly denied. The Overland Cotton Mill Company v.
Peo., 32 Colo. 263.
The information cannot be attacked by motion to quash
on the grounds that the person who verified the same had no
personal knowledge of the commisison of the offense charged.
Wickham v. Peo., 41 Colo. 345.
On a motion to quash the information, the accompanying
affidavit will not be held insufficient because it does not appear
by recital therein that the affiant is a competent witness to testify in the case, his competency being presumed until the contrary is shown. Walt v. Peo., 46 Colo. 136.
In the cases of Ausmus and Moon v. Peo., 47 Colo. '167,
Bosko et al. v. Peo., 68 Col. 57, Collins v. Peo., 69 Colo. 343,
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Wilkinson v. Peo., 86 Colo. 406, various forms of affidavit
were held to be in compliance with the statute.
These are all the Colorado cases dealing with this phase
of the information statute. We find the following conclusions
therefrom.
1. The affidavit attached to the information must show
probable cause;
2. Leave of court must be obtained for the filing of the
information, and it is prejudicial error not to obtain such leave.
We also deduce that the truthfulness of the affidavit cannot be attacked by motion to quash or by demurrer, nor upon
the trial.
The Supreme Court has held in effect that the granting
of leave to file an information is a determination of the existence of probable cause. When it is obtained ex parte, on a
false affidavit, is the court powerless to correct its error? May
the district attorney impose upon the court, willfully if he
choose, and having deluded the court into granting leave, contend that the court is powerless to purge its records of the
document filed by such means?
Every sense of decency, of right, and fair dealing compels
the conclusion that the court has power under such circumstances to revoke its leave, that the court owes a duty to society at large to repudiate its process when illegally invoked.
And as might be expected, the authorities hold that the court
has such power.
The State of Montana has a statute very similar to ours.
In the case of State v. Brett, 1895, 40 Pac. 873, cited with unqualified approval in Walker v. Peo., 22 Colo. 415, the Supreme Court of that state had occasion to say, while affirming
a conviction for forgery,
"It appears by the record that the information upon which the defendant
was convicted of the crime of forgery was filed by leave of court. Nevertheless, it is argued, a prosecution by information, where there has.been no preliminary examination is illegal, and a violation of constitutional rights. Const.
art. 3 Sec. 8, expressly provides that 'all criminal actions in the district court,
except those on appeal, shall be prosecuted by information, after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, or after leave granted by the court, or shall
be -prosecuted by indictment, without such examination or commitment, or
without leave of court.' It is evident that one of !the objects of the constitu-
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tion was to do away, to a great extent, with the machinery and expense of a
grand jury, by substituting therefor prosecution by information. It is not
necessary, in order to vest power in the county attorney, to file an information
that there shall be a preliminary examination and commitment. He may act,
after leave has been granted by the court, in a case like the one at bar, where
there may not have been any charge or information before a committing mag-

istrate. One of two methods of procedure is indispensable where an information is filed--either there must have been an examination and commitment,
or there must have been leave of court procured. But both steps are not
required. A plain interpretation of the words of the constitution by which
every clause of the section quoted shall be effective leads to this conclusion.

We think, too, that the rights of a defendant are guarded, no matter what
procedure is followed.

"1. Where an investigation into his guilt or innocence is had before a
committing magistrate, and a commitment is the result, such a judicial inquiry
is sufficient to justify the county attorney in proceeding in the district court
without first obtaining leave of that court to file an information, formally
charging the defendant with the offense for which he was examined, or any
other offense, by the facts disclosed upon such preliminary hearing. The
protection rests in the guaranty of a right to a judicial review of the matter
by an impartial magistrate.
"2. Where no examination has been had before a magistrate, and no
commitment has been made, in such case, to protect the rights of the defendant, and to guard him against oppression or malice, and to prevent abuse of
any general power vested in the county attorney, leave of the district court
is necessary to be obtained. Thus, again, there is the guaranty that a judicial
order will be required before there can even be a charge preferred. It is suggested that obtaining of a leave of the court is a mere perfunctory matter, and
is granted of course. This argument, if true, reflects credit upon the several
county attorneys of the state for having administered their offices with that
high sense of impartial responsibility and power imposed upon them by the
constitution, but it loses its entire force if an instance should arise where a
prosecuting officer oppressively, maliciously, or otherwise illegally should attempt to unjustly harass any citizen by filing an information charging him
with crime. At once, upon proper showing, or doubtless by order of the court
of its own motion, where the court should believe that a wrong was about to
be done, the leave of the court would be suspended or denied, until an inquiry
could be had into the reasons for the official acts of the county attorney in
filing the information, and until the court was satisfied by the showing made
that the case was one where an information should be filed. Thus, again,
the guaranty that judicial leave will be had before instituting a prosecution
affords safety to the innocent, quite ample to prevent any abuse of the power
of the state, in the hands of a prosecuting attorney. See State v. Bos'well, 104
Ind. 541, 4 N. E. 675."

The similarity of the statute of Montana to the Colorado
statute will be observed from the foregoing quotation from
the case of State v. Brett, supra.
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In 1895, the Supreme Court of Montana decided the case
of State v. Cain, 41 Pac. 709, an appeal by the state from an
order of the district court revoking its leave to file an information and discharging the defendant. The ground of defendant's motion, granted by the district court, was that the
grand jury had previously investigated his conduct with reference to the same matters alleged in the information, and no
true bill had been found. The opinion of the court is in part
as follows:
,
"rhis case is within the rule laid down in State v. Brett, 16 Mont.
40 Pac. 873, where it was held that, if an instance should arise where a county
attorney oppressively, maliciously, or otherwise illegally should attempt to
unjustly harass any citizen by filing an information against him charging him
with crime, the court, either of its own motion, or upon proper showing, would
suspend or deny its leave to file a charge until an inquiry could be had into
the reasons for the official acts of the county attorney in filing the information, and until it satisfactorily appeared by the showing made that the case
was one where an information should be filed. The affidavit of W. B. Rodgers
was sufficient to have warranted the court in refusing leave to permit an information to be filed against the defendant until some showing was made by
the county attorney for charging the defendant with a crime based upon the
identical acts into which a grand jury had inquired, but for the doing of
which they had failed to find a true bill. The fact that the information was
already on file when these facts were brought to the attention of the court
cannot affect the right of the court to revoke the leave already granted. If
the court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, had a right to withhold its leave to file the information at all until inquiry could be had, under
the limitations discussed in the Brett Case, supra, it had a right to revoke its
leave, where the defendant, directly after his arrest, and at the first opportunity presented, brought to the notice of the court the fact that his conduct
had already been investigated by a grand jury, and no true bill had been found.
Such was the effect of the defendant's motion. It brought to the attention
of the court matters upon the presentation of which the court, in its discretion,
and for apparent good cause, suspended its approval to file the information,
by revoking its former leave, and setting aside the subsequent proceedings.
The record discloses no request thereafter by the county attorney to file another
information, and no attempt on his part to demonstrate to the court that the
case was a proper one for further prosecution. The action of the district court
being within its discretionary power, and without abuse thereof, the judgment is affirmed."

It is believed the foregoing demonstrates that imprisonment pursuant to the process which issues as a matter of course
upon the filing of an information, is constitutional where the
accused has neither had nor waived a preliminary examina-
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tion because the leave of court required as a condition precedent to such filing is a judicial determination of probable
cause to believe the accused guilty of the offense charged
against him.
It is also submitted that the propositions and authorities
hereinbefore discussed demonstrate with equal force that the
court should revoke its leave to file an information upon being
advised of any matter which would have caused it to refuse
such leave in the first instance, whether such matter be the
falsity of the affidavit accompanying the information or any
other fact or circumstance which would have induced a judicial determination of lack of probable cause. Any other
construction reduces the constitutional guarantees hereinbefore quoted to impotent verbiage.

NOTICE
Dicta is attempting to assemble one or more complete
files of its forerunner, The Denver Bar Association Record.
Any stray copies of the Record which attorneys may have on
their shelves and which they do not care to retain in their
libraries, will be gratefully received. Please mail to Dicta,
Capitol Life Bldg., Denver, or telephone Mr. J. F. Pierce,
Key. 2211.

INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR
By Samuel H. Sterling of the Denver Bar
N this present period which has witnessed the end of the
greatest conflict between nations, and which has been followed up by several disarmament conferences, proposals
to outlaw war, and other treaties whose purpose has been to
lessen the barbarism of war as much as possible, it is interesting to go back to the beginning of man's intercourse with his
neighbors and trace the evolution of a phase of his conduct
thru to the present time. Law and laws do not stand still, and
this applies with equal force to the laws of the land, laws of
the nations, or laws of war.
The earliest form of government or power which our
early ancestors recognized was merely a patriarchal family.
We are familiar with this form of government which consisted
of merely a body of men banded together thru a common basis
of family ties. This body or tribe was necessarily small in
numbers, and for common protection against similar groups,
the next step was an alliance between several closely related
groups or families. These nomadic tribes wandered from
place to place, for after the .pasturage in one place was exhausted they had to find some other place, or starve. This,
then, marked the beginning of war. A tribe merely went thru
the process of moving on the desired land, and if this was contested the more powerful tribe wiped out the vanquished tribe.
The men of the vanquished tribe were killed, and the women
and children were taken as slaves, or for whatever purpose
best served the conquerors. All of the captured herds, pastures,
and property belonged to the victor, and no mercy was expected or given.
As the tribes multiplied and the pastures became scarcer,
the people discovered that it was possible to plant their foodstuffs, and since this was much easier, they gave up their
nomadic life, and settled along river valleys. This meant that
it was unnecessary to keep as strong a fighting force as they
had previously needed, so soldiers were only used for the purpose of repelling encroachments upon their land by neighboring settlements. However, the next natural step was the town,
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and immediately after this the stronger tribes found themselves with so much land on their hands that it was necessary
to branch out into several towns. People living in the towns
found they could manufacture the produce or articles in that
particular region which would be saleable to the other towns,
so the immediate result was the establishment of trade routes,
and it was the opening and shutting of these ancient trade
routes, with the resultant wealth or poverty brought about by
the existence or lack of existence of the trade routes, which
provided the thing par excellence to fight about.
Certain rules of warfare were recognized from these
earliest of times. For instance, about the time of Alexander,
the Hindus studiously refrained from injuring the husbandman or his crops. The Greeks and Romans made use of
formal declarations of war, and they sometimes released their
prisoners on parole or for ransom. They also appear to have
denounced acts of violence against women and children. The
beginning of the Laws of War proper, however, came about at
the time of the Mohammedan invasion of Europe. Mohammed and his successors had codified the laws, and a brilliant
line of jurists had recorded the decisions under this code. That
portion of the laws applicable to a state of war is of considerable magnitude and is the first example we have of a systematic code of written laws of war.
According to the Mohammedan Code, war was to be.
made once a year upon the unbelievers, on the unorthodox, and
in tributary countries which had failed to live up to their
obligations. There were injunctions against the use of incendiary projectiles, cutting trees belonging to the enemy,
intercepting his water supply and the poisoning of wells. The
killing of women and children or the insane, and mutilation of
prisoners without orders, were all absolutely forbidden. However, minors of both sexes, and women, became the property
of their captors. The disposition of the adult male prisoners
was reserved to the commander, but the giving of food and
drink to prisoners was compulsory. The actual practice of the
Mohammedans was not always up to the standard of their
Code, but their method of conducting warfare along these
lines compared favorably with that of other nations of this
period.
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The great influx of barbarians into Western Europe during the fourth and fifth centuries introduced what was, perhaps, the lowest estate to which mankind has descended since
the beginning of recorded history. This period was characterized by a disregard of all laws on land, and piracy was the
common practice upon the seas. However, this was only the
darkness preceding the dawn, for during the reign of Charlemagne, and only to a little less extent afterwards, the restrictions
which the kings of France and the Church placed on private
wars tended strongly to reinstate more humane conditions.
The enslavement of prisoners gave way to a system of ransom.
Formal declarations of war came to be recognized as obligatory. The principles of chivalry were so conscientiously
drilled into the knights and aristocracy of Europe, that these
principles became a part of all that was best of the life of
Christian Europe. However, piracy had by no means been
stamped out at the close of the fourteenth century.
Among the things which marked the change from medieval to modern times was the great interest which was taken
in everything the ancients had to teach of the art of war. The
great principle enunciated at this time was that of Grotius,
who said "Measures that are necessary to a lawful end, we
have a right to use in war." In other words, useless injury is
unlawful. This meant that the nations go to war to accomplish some definite end, not for the destruction of their
enemies, and that only those things are lawful in the conduct
of war that are necessary to attain the object or end of the war.
This doctrine marks the change in trend of thought of the
Romans, or even of Machiavelli, who as late as 15.13 stated
that ordinary moral rules did not apply in matters of state.
The eighteenth century saw the death of the practice of
ransom, and the birth of provisions for the better care of the
sick and wounded. Pillage had already been done away with,
generally, and had been replaced by a system of contributions.
During the Revolutionary War, Great Britain promulgated
the following as recognized laws of war:
1. An army which has occupied the country of an enemy may demand
provisions there and levy contributions and, to force the inhabitants to satisfy
these demands, may resort to military executions; that is, ravage and destruction.
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2. When the enemy, being in his own country, finds it to his advantage
to prolong the war and evade coming to action, it is permissible to ravage the
country in his presence to make him expose himself in attempting to protect
the country.
3. When, in war, one is not able to destroy the adverse party or lead
him to reason without reducing his country to distress, it is permitted to carry
distress into his country.
4. When the inhabitants are themselves the principal parties to the
war, which happens in the case of a revolt or a rebellion, they are themselves
the principal objects of hostilities which one is under the necessity of directing
against them to attain the end of the war.

The Napoleonic Wars spread the doctrine that the ownership of invaded territory, like that of other forms of property,
passed without qualification to the belligerent who had taken
the property or territory securely into his possession. It was
presumed that a belligerent always intended to appropriate all
the territory that he could lay his hands on. This theory was
shattered by the French Revolution, and thereafter it became
settled law that the ownership of territory is not gained by
military occupation but by terms of the subsequent treaty of
peace.
All of the early efforts for the amelioration of the hardships of war were contained in treaties that were entered into
by the belligerants, usually with reference to a single battle.
The first real step towards the codification of the laws of war,
a step which had been advocated for many years, came with
the Congress which assembled at Paris in 1856 at the end of
the Crimean War. The resulting 'Declaration of Paris,'
signed by representatives of England, France, Russia, Prussia,
Austria and later by Turkey and Sardinia, was also quite
generally accepted by the other powers. Its four articles were:
1. Privateering is and remains abolished.
2. The neutral flag covers enemy goods, except contraband of war.
3. Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to capture
under the enemy's flag.
4. Blockades, to be binding, must be effective.

The United States, on account of the strict prohibition against
privateering, refused to sign the Declaration of Paris unless
the articles were so changed as to exempt all private property
at sea from capture, except in cases of contraband or where
the property was involved in the violation of an effective

DICTA

blockade. The second and third of the above articles were
departed from by Germany during this last war, and France
and Great Britain departed from the second by way of retaliation, but the rules, nevertheless, still have behind them the express consent of most civilized states, and the tacit consent of
the remainder.
The efforts of the Geneva Society of Public Utility resulted in the assemblage, in a semi-official conference, of military and medical men, about half of whom represented various governments, for "the consideration of the amelioration
of the condition of the sick and wounded in warfare." This
conference sitting in 1863 had the power to take steps toward
calling a congress to represent the governments themselves.
This was done, with the result that delegates from sixteen
countries met at Geneva in August of 1864. A treaty known
as the "Geneva Convention," adopted the general views expressed by the conference of the preceding year, and this treaty
now binds practically all the outstanding powers of the world.
In 1868, at the instance of the Emperor Alexander of
Russia, Russia issued an invitation to the various powers of
the.world to meet and draw up a treaty chiefly concerning the
prohibition of the explosive bullet, or bullet which had been
invented at that time which exploded upon coming in contact
with the human body. The labors of this "International
Military Commission," as the conference styled itself, resulted
in a declaration acceded to by most European states, to the
effect that the only legitimate object of accomplishment of war
was to weaken the military forces of the enemy; that for this
purpose it was sufficient to disable; that this object should not
be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravated the sufferings of the disabled men or rendered their
death inevitable. The treaty also prescribed the minimum
size of explosive projectiles.
The Society for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Prisoners of War, in 1874, again took steps towards calling
a convention, which met that year in Brussels. At this conference an effort was made to abolish contributions, but without success. However, it was decided that requisitions and
contributions should be limited to the necessities of the case.
Great Britain refused to ratify the resulting declaration, oh-
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jecting to certain articles concerning the use of irregular
troops. This meeting disclosed two different views as to the
kind of troops permissible of use in war. States maintaining
great military establishments desired to make it unlawful for
an invaded country to use irregular forces or to organize
levees en masse among the inhabitants. States with small
regular establishments held out just as strongly for almost any
kind of patriotic resistance to invasion. While the Brussels
Conference of 1874 never obtained official recognition, the
discussion bore great weight in the later Hague Conventions.
In fact, these subsequent Hague Conventions did little more
than adopt the principles enunciated by the Brussels Conference.
Shortly after the close of hostilities between the United
States and Spain, the Czar of Russia issued an invitation to a
conference "which would seek the most effectual means for
securing to all peoples the benefits of a real and durable peace,
and above all, for putting an end to the progressive development of the present armaments." So we see that Disarmament
Conferences are no new innovations, for this invitation in 1898
extended the first invitation to a conference of this kind. Thus,
for the first time in history, a great international assembly met
for the express purpose of acting as a sort of rudimentary legislature by considering not one question alone, but many, and
making laws thereon for the whole family of nations. The
Brussels draft of 1874 was considered, and for the most part
accepted. In addition, three new rules were adopted, namely,
the first prohibited the throwing of projectiles or explosives
from ballons for a period of five years; the second prohibited
the employment of projectiles the sole object of which was the
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases; and the third
prohibited the employment of bullets which expand or flatten
easily in the human body.
The next step in the development of a codification of the
laws of war was taken by the Swiss Government which invited
the powers signatory to the Geneva Convention of 1864 to a
conference for the purpose of discussing the advisability of a
revision of the rules adopted at that time. The conference met
in 1906, thirty-seven powers being represented. This conference remedied various faults which had been found to exist
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in the earlier convention, and cleared up numerous misunderstandings growing out of uncertainty as to the meaning of certain words and phrases which rendered some of the earlier
provisions unworkable.
A year later a second peace conference met at the Hague,
which was proposed by President Roosvelt. Forty-seven nations were invited to send representatives, and all but three
complied. The results of the work of this conference were
voluminous, and form the last great effort to reduce the laws
of war to a code and secure for the same the general recognition of the civilized world. The voluminous treaty adopted
at this time dealt with the status and qualifications of belligerents, prisoners of war, sick and wounded, means of injuring
the enemy, sieges, bombardments, spies, truces, capitulations,
armistices, military authority over the territory of the hostile
state, the rights and duties of neutral powers, belligerents
interned and wounded tended in neutral territory, railway material, restrictions relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines, the Red Cross-their personnel, material, emblems, and rights. Many of the stipulations in this
treaty were departed from, either knowingly or in retaliation,
during this last war, however, it still remains as the greatest
humanitarian treaty between nations opposed to each other, or
as neutrals, in war.
The Conference on the Limitation of Armament called
by President Harding in 1921 primarily considered the limitation of the armaments of nations. However, the representatives also approved a resolution, not in the nature of a treaty,
which provided for the assembling of a commission of jurists
to amend the laws of war. This commission assembled in 1922,
held its last session at the Hague on February 19, 1923. Its
work was limited to recently developed implements of war.
Briefly stating the general precepts and rules which are
at the present time in force by reason of the foregoing treaties,
we find that the taking or destruction of private property is
prohibited except in cases of urgent necessity where it is needed for the use or subsistence of the army or for defense against
the enemy. However, a commander may seize or destroy any
private property to keep it from falling into the hands of the
enemy or from being availed of by him for attack or defense.
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The exigency must be imminent, not contingent or remote.
Ordinarily, property taken by the government must be paid
for by the government, but where the destruction or damage
is occasioned by legitimate operations against an enemy in an
emergency, the owner cannot prosecute any claim. No intercourse between two enemy nations can be had by any of the
inhabitants of either of them, unless it is done under a flag of
truce, armistice, or under a license issued by the government.
Wars are waged against the state as a belligerent only, and not
against individuals. So, killing or disabling the members of
one army by those of a hostile army are permissible, but it is a
crime to kill or commit violence against non-combatants and
private individuals not in arms, including surrendering prisoners, surgeons, first-aid workers, and the sick. Property does
not become the property of the capturing forces, except in case
of funds, munitions, supplies, or means of transportation.
Public buildings cannot be destroyed, but factories, mills,
foundaries, depots, offices or any other buildings may be
destroyed at will. Only regular forces are considered as
soldiers with the corresponding rights. Guerillas or other
irregular armed bodies not a part of the organized forces of
a belligerent, when captured, may be summarily punished,
even with death. Illegitimate weapons of war include those
which, in disabling or causing death, inflict a needless, unusual
or unreasonable amount of torture or injury. Poison or
poisoned weapons, explosive bullets weighing less than 400
grammes, projectiles filled with powdered glass, dum-dum
bullets, etc., come under this head. Poisoning wells constitutes
a marked violation of this principle. The use of poison gas is
a violation of the treaty, but Germany's use brought about the
retaliatory use by the Allies. Resort to the employment of
assassins, or other violent and secret methods which cannot be
guarded against by ordinary vigilance, such as the use of
savage allies, introduction of infectious or contagious diseases,
etc., is interdicted by civilized usage.
Prisoners of war are not convicts, and no violence against
them is justified by the mere fact that they are enemies. If
they cannot be subsisted, they should be released on parole.
The days of "no quarter" on the battlefield have passed, and
it is a grave violation of the laws of war to kill prisoners of
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war or subject them to unreasonably harsh or cruel treatment.
The personal effects of prisoners of war remain their own
property, except such as may be intended for or adapted to
military use.
Offenders against the laws of war are usually brought to
trial before a military commission. Should a belligerent refuse to bring an offender to trial, the other belligerent may
resort to the taking of hostages, to reprisal, or some other form
of retaliation. The right of retaliation will not justify a resort
to measures repudiated by civilized warfare. Cruelty, inhumanity, or gross and unjustifiable injury practiced by one
belligerent will not justify or warrant a similar proceeding by
way of retaliation on the part of the other.
These are but a few examples taken at random from what
is, at the present time, a very large body of laws and regulations acceded to, and followed by, practically all of the
civilized nations of the world. The laws of war are unlike
military law proper in that they are not comprised in a formal
written code, but consist mainly of general rules derived from
international law, supplemented by acts and orders of the military power. They are also quite unlike and independent of
the ordinary law. In the actual theater of active military
operations, for example, the ordinary laws of the land are
superseded by the laws of war. Even the highest law of our
land, the Constitution itself, during a crisis or grave national
emergency, apparently may be supplanted for a time, in the
theatre of active military operations, by the laws of war. Thus
in Varner v. Arnold, 83 N. C. 210, the court said, referring to
the Constitution, that during the Civil War "Its voice was
hushed and its power suspended amid the din of arms."
It is a fact that since medieval times the laws of war have
undergone a great change in the direction of the amelioration
of the conduct of war generally. That moral considerations
have been the dominant force in bringing about their upward
trend, cannot be denied. One of the most impressive features
of the laws of war is that in their influence on the conduct of
war they stand apart. Improvements in-strategy, tactics, munitions, equipment, and other adjuncts to carrying on war, are
destructive in their nature. That fact is not altered by the
contention that this or that species of weapon or bullet is more
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humane than some other form of the same thing. The Laws of
War, on the other hand, tend to preserve and ameliorate rather
than to overthrow and destroy, and while they have moved
upward hand in hand with the growth and development of
the conduct of war along other phases, their effect has been to
continue, so far as possible, the normal and well balanced conditions of peace, not only with respect to neutral nations but
also with respect to those nations actually in belligerency who
are playing no direct part in the clash of arms. The laws of
war have even gone farther than this. While recognizing the
right of the nations at war to destroy human life in battle and
to wound the members of the enemy's army in active conflict,
yet the moment one of those members is placed hors de combat,
either by reason of wounds or capture, the Laws of War step
in and shield him from further harm until his legal status is
so changed that he again becomes an active element.
It is useless to speculate upon whether in this interplay of
forces the laws of war with their ameliorations on the one hand
and the implements of war with their intensive destructive
powers on the other will eventually result in victory for the
former with the accompaniment of a perpetual world peace.
The only thing that can now be said is that the Laws of War
constitute an imperfect manifestation of what is best in modern
civilization, and seems to strive for still higher levels with each
stage of development of the human race.

DICTAPHUN
UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IS
PERNICIOUS
It appears from the report of Committee on Professional Ethics of the
Denver Bar Association (8 Dicta (9) 14)* that the w. k. firm of X. Y. & Z.
have twice as much business as A. B. & C. Yes, and some board of county
commissioners is always trying to hire one of the alphabet boys right in the
middle of a suit in which the soup material is on t'other side.

HOW FLEET THE WORKS OF MAN:
THE EARTH AGAIN

BACK TO

"Resolved, by the Council and House of Representatives of Colorado
Territory, That we freely concede to Boulder county the proud position to
rank as the banner county in this Territory, and that her citizens deserve and
are entitled to the thanks and commendations of the people .....
." Laws
of Fourth Session Territorial Assembly, 151. Approved February 9, 1865.

WHO TRANSLATES THEM INTO ENGLISH?
"Be it resolved by the Council and House of Representatives, of Colorado
Territory, That the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars shall be and the
same is hereby appropriated . . . . for the purpose of paying the expense of
translating the annual message of Acting Governor Elbert into the Spanish
language ......
" Id., 150. Approved February 10, 1865.

THE SAME YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW
AND FOREVER
The same assemblage of learned gents also memorialized Congress to
raise their pay from three to ten bucks a day. Op. cit. (whatever that means)

150.

THE FLUSH TIMES IN COLORADO
"In the same district (Nevadaville) in 1861 W. Train Mewir was the
Judge. Although not a man inclined to hunt a quarrel, he was what was
called 'right square on the fight.' The case before the court (Henry M. Teller
.q.

V.

26

DICTA

was of counsel) was one for slander of a widow, and it seems it had gone on
until a good deal of ill feeling had arisen among the lawyers and between some
of them and the Judge. The court room was a saloon (ah!) engaged for the
occasion. Each lawyer had a big navy or a horse pistol on the table before
him. The Judge had one of huge dimensions, perhaps two feet long, which he
used to enforce order. There was no jail or prison, so it was useless to attempt
to fine a man for contempt of court, and the way the judge brought an
attorney to order was by bringing down his shooting iron and taking 'a bead'
on the offender, at the same time that he commanded him to 'sit down'. This
had the desired effect of temporarily quieting the obstreperous scions of the
law and also, of clearing the room for a few moments, of all who stood within
range. On the third day of the trial, Rankin, one of the lawyers for the
defense, attempted to read a letter from some person in Illinois, reflecting on
the lady's character, but the court would not receive it as evidence. In summing up the case another attempt was made to submit the letter and ranking
swore it would be admitted if his side must kill every one opposing, and drew
his revolver. Then there was a general drawing of revolvers by some half a
dozen men on each side, who ranged themselves in line of battle while the
spectators hastily withdrew. The opinion of the court was sustained, however, without bloodshed."-Fossett Colorado, publishing 1876.
We save an exception.

THE DEAR DEAD DAYS OF FORDIAN HUMOR
"This is an action in replevin to recover a Ford machine, called in the
complaint an automobile." Hoy v. Gorst, 79 Oregon 617.

THE HOG CASE IS NOT SO WEAK
"The question seems to be whether the cheese case is law; that is a very
strong case." Reg. v. Burgon, Dears. & B. 22.

CHILDREN'S CORNER
Read this one without abbreviation:

Conn v. Converse.t

LATIN POETRY DEPARTMENT-ANSWER
NEXT MONTH
Advocatus sed non latro
Res mirando populo.
t164 Iowa 604.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(ErnmWx's No'ram-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

AUTOMOBILES-LIABILITY

OF DRIVER FOR THE DEATH

DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR-Clune

OF

PASSENGER-

v. Mercereau-No. 12491-

Facts.-Action for death of plaintiff's husband, alleged to have been
caused by defendant's negligence in operating his automobile. The only
evidence as to how the accident occurred was that of the defendant brought
out on cross examination under the statute. He testified that the deceased
and he were on a hunting trip; that the defendant was driving his own car
and ascending a very steep grade in intermediate gear; that the car slackened
in speed and would not make the grade and that he attempted to shift in low
gear, but the car started to go backwards, and he applied his brakes, but they
would not hold the car; and the road seemed to cave, and precipitated the car
over the bank; that it was a wet, slippery road; that after the car left the
road, he attempted to hold it straight, hoping to run it into the river, but it
was overturned and the plaintiff's husband was killed. Plaintiff was nonsuited.
Held.-The evidence fails to disclose the negligence charged. Assuming,
but not deciding, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in cases not
involving common carriers, it is not applicable to the instant case because the
accident is just as reasonably attributable to other causes as to negligence.Affirmed.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STORM SEWERS-APPORTIONMENT OF COST ON

AREA BAsis-Ross, et al. v. City and County of Denver-No. 12542.

Facts.-Ross, and others, owners of lots in Park Hill Storm Sewer District sought to enjoin the defendant city and its officers in the matter of the
establishment of a storm sewer district. A general demurrer was sustained to
the plaintiffs' amended petition, upon which the plaintiffs elected to stand, and
the lower court dismissed the action.
The petition alleged that the plaintiffs are the owners of more than 6500
lots in the proposed sewer district; that the apportionment of the costs thereof
on an area basis instead of on the basis of the benefits received by the lots is a
taking of their property without due process of law, and that on this area basis
the costs assessed against the lots will be in some instances more than the
market value of the lots, -and that in many instances the lots will not be
benefited in any manner. That protests against the assessment were overruled
by the City Council without a hearing.
Held.-I. Assessments for local improvements apportioned on the area
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basis, insofar as it exceeds the benefits is violative of the constitutional provision against the taking of private property without just compensation.
2. A failure to grant a full hearing before a body clothed with sufficient
power to grant proper relief is violative of the due process of law provision
of the constitution.-Reversed.

WATERS-C-OWNERSHIP OF DITCH-TENANTS IN COMMON-LIABILITY
FOR WATER-The Wanamaker Ditch Company v. Pettit et al.-No. 12261.

Facts.-Plaintiffin error, who was plaintiff below, owns the Wanamaker
Ditch, from which for many years the defendants have taken water for irrigation. The defendants claim they are the owners of an interest in the ditch
and have the right to take their water without charge except for their proportionate share of the expenses of upkeep. The plaintiff's position is that defendants are subject to the same charges for delivery of water as strangers.
The defendants purchased the real estate prior to the incorporation of
the plaintiff from one Williams, who was a half owner in the Wanamaker
Ditch, and, at the same time, Williams conveyed a pro rata water right in the
ditch to the defendants. After the corporation was formed, the defendants
refused to accept stock in the corporation in place of their pro rata interest
in the ditch.
Held.-I. The defendants are co-owners in the ditch. They bought
the land to which the water belonged. Their grantor was one of the owners
of the ditch and he sold them whatever in the way of irrigation water belonged to the land transferred.
2. Williams' guarantee to the defendants of a maximum annual pro
rata upkeep of $7.50 is not a covenant running with the land, but the plaintiff
by ratifying and adopting it, is bound thereby.-Affirmed.

MINORS -

DEPENDENCY -

UNLAWFUL CoMMITFMENT-IRREGULAR

PRO-

CEEDINGS-Ziemer v. Wheeler-No. 12850.

Facts.-Wheeler filed complaint in the County Court, requesting that
the eleven children of Ziemer be declared dependent and neglected children
and, as such, committed to the State Home for Dependent Children. Citation
was issued requiring Ziemer and his wife to appear at a hearing the second day
thereafter, but the citation was not served nor was there a statutory waiver.
The complaint was not signed. The children were not at the hearing, nor
was anybody there to represent them. No witnesses were sworn, nor was any
evidence taken; and thereupon the order of committment was entered.
Held.-Because the citation was not served in time, nor was there a
statutory waiver of service, nor were the parents advised regarding the nature
of the proceedings, nor the effect of the order as provided in Section 605 C. L.
1921, the Court was without jurisdiction, and its entire proceedings and decree
and order were void.-Reversed with instructions to dismiss the proceedings.
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BILLS AND NOTES-ESTOPPEL To DENY PAYMENT-The Colorado National

Bank vs. David, et al.-No. 12442.

Facts.-The Colorado National.Bank sued to foreclose a deed of trust to
the Public Trustee of the City and County of Denver, executed by Michael
and Mary David, and to cancel a release of said deed of trust from the Public
Trustee, and to recover personal judgment against Michael David, Mary
David, and B. E. Van Arsdale, for the principal and interest due on said note.
David and wife executed the deed of Trust securing a $3,000.00 note, payable
three years after date, to one Siener. Siener put up the note and deed of trust
as collateral security to the Colorado National Bank, but the Bank never
notified the makers that they were holding the note and deed of trust and they
permitted Siener to collect the interest and hold himself out as the owner. A
new loan was procured to pay off the original loan and the money was paid to
Siener, who produced and surrendered a forged note, but who represented
himself to be the owner of the note, and Siener executed a request for a release
of the original mortgage, and it was released without the knowledge of the
Colorado National Bank. Judgment below for the defendants.
Held.-I. Payment of the original note to Siener, the ostensible owner
of the note constituted payment under the facts in this case.
2. The Colorado National Bank is estopped from denying payment by
its acts in failing to notify the makers of the note that it had acquired the note
and deed of trust, and by permitting Siener to hold himself out as the owner
of the note and permitting him to collect the interest on it, and the release
of the deed of trust was valid as against the Colorado National Bank, even
though the Bank was the actual owner of the note and deed of trust.
-- ffrmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, TORTS OF-GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS-City

and County of Denver v. Forstr-No.12301.

Facts.-Plaintiffintestate sustained personal injuries when she stumbled
and fell over the metal button used by the city to block off its "safety zones".
Plaintiff below alleged negligence which was denied by the defendant. Held
in the court below for the plaintiff, defendant alleged error.
Held.-It is unnecessary to decide upon the negligence or lack of negligence of the city in establishing these safety zones. "The construction and
maintenance of the streets of a municipality has been often held by this court
to be a corporate matter for which liability may in proper cases be imposed by

the making and enforcing of 'ordinances, regulating the use of streets, brings
into exercise governmental and not corporate powers, and for any act or
omission of duty in regard to the enforcement of such ordinances, there is no
liability in the absence of a statute imposing one'."-Reversed and remanded,
with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

NEGOTIATION INSTRUMENTSGUARANTY - SUBROGATION - Cobbey v.
Peterson-No. 12411.
Facts.-Plaintiff guaranteed the note of one Schmid to the defendant
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Cobbey. Defendant, in a prior suit, and by means of executions, secured full
settlement of the note from the plaintiff. Before actual satisfaction of the
final judgment which defendant had secured against the plaintiff, defendant
sold the note to another, who subsequently secured satisfaction from the maker.
After judgment had been satisfied, plaintiff demanded the note from the
defendant on the grounds that he desired to be subrogated. The defendant
had, however, placed it beyond his power to produce the note, and plaintiff
instituted this action.
Held for the plaintiff in the court below, defendant alleges error.
Held.-Defendant's contention that subrogation is improper because the
claim was reduced to judgment is unsound. "The rule is * * * that where
the ends of justice requires, the judgment does not annihilate the debt, and
that the doctrine of merger will be carried no further than the ends of justice
demand." -Affirmed.
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A man's professonal standling is often advanced more
qiaickly 6y seemingly
things--is
engraved statione"
for

THE W.

H.

smai
instance.

KISTLER STATIONERY CO.
MAIN 5161

AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
ACCURATE AND DEPENDABLE ESTIMATES FURNISHED

PROMPT, COMPLETE REPAIR SERVICE
Twelve Years Dependable Service Has Caused Many Leading Denver Law Firms to Entrust
to Us the Inspection, the Estimate, the Repairs, and Re-conditioning
I
of Wrecked or Stolen Cars

HARRISON MOTORS, Inc.
2031 Stout Street

DENVER

Phone KEystone 2341

DICTA

Compliments of

Brown Palace Hotel
THE

W. H.
1550

COURTRIGHT PUBLISHING Co.

GLENARM PLACE

-

*

MAIN 6448

DENVER

LAW BOOKS
COMPLETE STOCK NEW AND SECOND-HAND BOOKS
AND LIBRARIES FOR COLORADO LAWYERS

SAVE MONEY

FOR ALL
LEGAIL

By Having Your

Notices, Reports, Form Letters
MIMEOGRAPHED or MULTIGRAPHED

MU
MUTUAL MULTIGRAPHING CO.

DADVERTISING

The Daily Journal
EFFICIENT SERVICE
302 KITTREDGE BUILDING

ZELKIN BROS., Mgrs.
710 KITTREDGE BLDG., DENVER

KEystone 4969

TAbor 6725

HERBERT FAIRALL ANDJAMES E. GAULE.

Quick Service-Moderate Prices

PUBLISHERS

REGISTERED ATTORNEY U. S. AND CANADIAN PATENT CFFICES

R. H. GALBREATH
PATENT ATTORNEY
U. S. and FOREIGN PATENTS, TRADEMARKS and COPYRIGHTS
TELEPHONE TABOR 0425

Denver Theatre Buildind

DENVER

1545 Glenarm Street

